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Walter Pforzheimer

15 November 1991

Dear Ken:

Herewith, the paper I sent to DCI in August 1946 on the intelligence aspects of the Joint Congressional Committee Report on Pearl Harbor. Forty five years later, it still seems to stand up. I have always considered this Cong. Report one of their better ones. I think this is the first document we could find that I signed in my legislative capacity. I wonder whether it might be of any interest to Studies in Intelligence, given the fact that we are in the 50th anniversary of that event. By the way, future DCI R. H. Hillenkoetter was the Exec of the West Virginia at PH, and, I think, was the ranking wounded surviving officer of that battleship on that date.

Per our telecon

STAT

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22 August 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Subject: Intelligence at Pearl Harbor

1. Pursuant to Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 27, Seventy-ninth Congress, (September 1945), a Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack was established to investigate the attack, and events and circumstances relating thereto.

2. In July 1946, the Committee Report was published, together with the additional views of one Congressman and the Minority Report of two Senators.

3. A study of the Committee Report has been made by the undersigned from the viewpoint of ascertaining the role, achievements, and shortcomings of intelligence in connection with the attack on Pearl Harbor. This intelligence study is attached herewith. No attempt has been made to examine the Committee Report from a military or diplomatic standpoint. Rather, this paper is restricted solely to the problems of intelligence.

4. For convenience, this study of the Committee Report has been divided into four tabs as follows:

TAB A — Collection

TAB B — Research and Evaluation

TAB C — Dissemination

TAB D — Deficiencies, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee

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5. The following are among the major conclusions and recommendations reached by the Committee:

a. Intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibilities.

b. The armed services should:

(1) Select officers for intelligence work who possess the background and capacity for such work;

(2) Retain these officers on intelligence duty for an extended period of time;

(3) Insure that officers with an aptitude for intelligence receive such assignments and do not have their progress impeded or their promotions affected.

c. The restriction of highly classified information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of an organization.

d. There should be complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies.

e. Congress should consider legislation fully protecting the security of classified matter and amending the Communications Act of 1934 insofar as it handicaps our intelligence agencies with regard to wire tapping.

6. Nothing in the additional views of Congressman Keefe or the Minority Report of Senators Brewster and Ferguson materially changes the Majority Report insofar as intelligence is concerned. All dates, unless otherwise indicated, are in the year 1941.

WALTER L. PFORZHEIMER
Chief, Legislative Liaison Branch

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COLLECTION

A considerable amount of information regarding Japanese plans, intentions, and capabilities was collected by the military and naval intelligence services, both in Washington and in the field, prior to Pearl Harbor.

The greatest source of intelligence information concerning Japanese plans was provided by the interception and decoding of messages from Japan to its diplomatic establishments. These intercepts were known by the code name Magic, and were provided by a joint operation of the Army and Navy. This operation was characterized by the Congressional Committee as "meriting the highest commendation" because of the "exercise of the greatest ingenuity and utmost resourcefulness" by the services.

To protect the security of Magic, it was necessary to pursue a policy of extremely limited distribution of the material. Thus it was possible to avoid alerting the Japanese to the fact that their diplomatic codes had been broken. Had the Japanese been aware of this fact, they would have changed their codes, resulting obviously in complete loss of Magic until the new codes could be broken.

The greatest volume of Magic traffic, was of primary interest to the State Department, being diplomatic in nature, although certain elements of the information were of interest to the Armed Services. Many of the messages concerned the espionage activities of Japanese consular staffs, particularly regarding the location and movements of American ships and the status of military installations.

Detailed analysis of the intelligence secured through Magic is

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not required by this paper. However, it is interesting to note that the Magic interceptions included such messages (now much publicized) as the "winds" code, the "berthing" plan of Pearl Harbor, the "hidden word" code, the "deadline" messages, and the 14-part message of 6-7 December. In addition, as pointed out in the section of this paper on "Dissemination", messages were intercepted which showed the destruction by the Japanese of their secret codes and confidential papers.

Vital information was obtained by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet from the daily summaries prepared by the Radio Intelligence Unit at Hawaii which, through traffic analyses, identified, located, and determined the movements of Japanese warships by their call signals and by radio direction-finding techniques. A similar unit was included within the Naval Command in the Philippines. The reports of the latter unit were considered the more reliable, and all Pacific radio intelligence reports were submitted to the Philippine Unit for evaluation. Copies of these evaluations were available to Kimmel, as were fortnightly intelligence bulletins from these sources by ONI.

Close liaison was maintained in Hawaii between the services and the FBI. The latter provided considerable information of significance, including (on December 6) the so-called "Mori Call", which was a transcript of an intercepted radio telephone conversation between a member of the Mori family in Honolulu and an individual in Japan. The transcript indicated that the latter was interested in such military information as daily flights of aeroplanes, searchlights, and ship locations in Pearl Harbor.

In addition to the sources of collection listed above, there was the information to be obtained from the aircraft warning radar, which detected incoming Japanese planes on December 7th while they were still 130 miles from Oahu. (The failure to take advantage of this is now history.)

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In addition, Washington recommended visual and photographic reconnaissance of the Japanese mandated islands, including troop concentrations in the Carolines and Marshalls. This recommendation for collection was not exploited.

The Committee also studied Japanese collection of intelligence, basing its resulting conclusions largely on post-VJ-Day reports of interrogations of knowledgeable Japanese. The following may be listed as among the main sources of Japanese intelligence:

(1) Espionage;
(2) Consular staffs;
(3) Naval attaches of the Japanese Embassy in Washington;
(4) Newspapers in the United States;
(5) American public radio broadcasts;
(6) Crews and passengers on ships which docked in Hawaii;
(7) General information;
(8) Foreign diplomatic establishments;
(9) Commercial firms;
(10) Signal intelligence;
(11) Submarine reconnaissance in Hawaiian waters.

Early reports, by committees and boards investigating Pearl Harbor prior to the Congressional Committee, had supported the belief that one of the determining factors in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor was that the Japanese had the benefit of unusually superior intelligence. All early reports indicated the probability of extensive Japanese espionage activity in Hawaii. The Congressional Committee, however, concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that superior Japanese intelligence "had nothing whatever to do" with the decision to attack Pearl Harbor, and furthermore that Japanese espionage in Hawaii was not notably effective in securing the information necessary to support the attack plans. While interrogations in Japan indicate that one of the factors in the decision to attack Pearl Harbor over the week-end was the knowledge that the Fleet ordinarily came into the harbor on Friday and remained over the week-end, further

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interrogations and investigations in Japan reveal that, except for the consul in Honolulu and his staff, espionage agents played no major role in the plans for attack. It was therefore felt by the Committee that the role of espionage in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack has been magnified out of proportion to its significance.

As noted previously, much of the Japanese traffic intercepted by Magic was diplomatic in nature, but many of the intercepted messages concerned espionage activities by Japanese consular staffs, particularly as to the location and movement of American ships and the nature of military and defensive installations. However, Japanese interrogated since VJ-Day have placed little importance on intelligence obtained from the consulates. For example, the Japanese did not include the so-called "berthing plan" of Pearl Harbor (see "Research and Evaluation" section of this report) in listing information used by the attacking force at Pearl Harbor. This plan had been supplied by the consulate at Honolulu.

From newspapers and magazines published in the United States, the Japanese compiled material regarding America's war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, locations and capabilities of aircraft and naval units, military strengths at Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines, and elsewhere.

In connection with items of general information, Admiral Wilkinson, former Chief of ONI, testified that "the Japanese for many years had the reputation of being meticulous seekers for every scrap of information...." In this connection the Admiral pointed out that the Japanese were also making investigations of naval installations at Seattle, Bremerton, Long Beach, San Diego, Panama, and Manila, as well as evincing an unusual

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interest in the presence of our Pacific Fleet and its detailed location within Pearl Harbor.

General information, in addition, included detailed bits of intelligence regarding the habits, strength, and security of the Fleet in Hawaii, which the Intelligence Section of the Japanese Naval General Staff had been amassing for years.

Of great interest is the fact that the Japanese placed little credence on reports from commercial firms in foreign countries. The Japanese regarded these reports as not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a "special write-up, and were considered on their own merits."

The Japanese employed signal intelligence to deduce (from signals from American ships) the number of ships and small craft of the Pacific Fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor or out on training. The fleet training areas were also determined partially in this manner.

Commander Ono, staff communications officer of the Japanese striking force, kept close watch on Hawaiian broadcasts as the task force approached Pearl Harbor. It was felt that it could be determined from these broadcasts whether the forces on Oahu had any inkling of the impending attack. Since stations KGU and KGMB were broadcasting normally, Admiral Nagumo felt that American forces were still oblivious of developments. For several days prior to the attack, the Jap force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but by means of radio direction finders they had been able to plot in the plane positions, knew the number of patrol planes in the air at all times and that patrols were entirely in the southwestern sector off Oahu.

After sifting the information available on Japanese collection of

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intelligence material prior to Pearl Harbor, the Committee concluded that there were certain weaknesses in Japanese intelligence. This statement is supported by the fact that the Japanese estimates as to our air strength in Hawaii, made late in the fall of 1941, were thoroughly erroneous, and the margin of error was such as to make it impossible to credit them with superior intelligence. The Committee also felt that the Japanese did not have accurate intelligence as to our real naval weakness in the Pacific.

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RESEARCH AND EVALUATION

The Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack reached the "indisputable" conclusion that "the attack on Pearl Harbor surprised the defending Army and Navy establishments."

General Marshall testified that the fullest protection for the Pacific Fleet was the major consideration of the Army. The secondary consideration was the protection of the Hawaiian Islands. The question then arises as to whether intelligence performed its role in this mission.

The Committee felt that the military and naval commands in Hawaii were "properly chargeable with possessing highly significant information and intelligence in the days before Pearl Harbor..." It also felt that this was true in Washington, where much information, particularly Magic, was available to the heads of the intelligence sections of both of the services, as well as to the State Department. There also appeared to be the closest cooperation at the Secretarial level between Secretaries Hull, Stimson, and Knox.

It is the purpose of this section of this report to note briefly the major items of information available to intelligence officers of the Army and Navy for research and evaluation prior to Pearl Harbor, and the estimates resulting therefrom.

A letter from Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations, dated 18 February 1941, stated:

> "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air, or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility, and we are taking immediate practical steps to minimize the damage inflicted and to ensure that the attacking force will pay."

In March 1941, General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Base Defense Air Force, pre-

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pared a joint estimate foreseeing possible sudden hostile action in the Hawaiian area. This estimate included as possibilities, an air attack on the fleet, the arrival of Japanese submarines or a fast raiding force, with no prior warning to the defenders from American intelligence services. Thus it is evident that a possible surprise air attack on Pearl Harbor was in the minds of its defenders at an early date.

There was, of course, available for research and evaluation a mass of material obtained by Magic. As set forth in the section of this paper on Dissemination, the War Department did not disseminate Magic material to its commander in Hawaii. The Army did not feel its codes to be sufficiently secure for this purpose, though certain elements of information were of such a nature as to be of value to the field commanders, and though from time to time the Navy did forward this material to the Pacific Fleet in the form of estimates or paraphrases. While the Committee felt that the decision not to supply field commanders with all of the Magic was a reasonable one, the feeling was also expressed that this material, insofar as it was pertinent, should have reached the field commanders in the form of operational estimates.

The Committee felt that the Japanese message of November 15 (translated December 3), referring to critical relations between the United States and Japan, and requesting that the "ships in harbor" berthing report be made irregularly, but at least twice a week, and directing that extra care be taken to maintain its secrecy, should have raised the question as to whether or not this was highly important intelligence to the Pacific Fleet. While the Committee deems that the so-called "berthing plan" at Pearl Harbor and related dispatches could not be concluded to be a bomb plot, it felt that since a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet base was indicated, this intelli-

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gence should have been appreciated and disseminated to the commanding officers in Hawaii together with other available intelligence to assist them in making an estimate of the situation. It is interesting to note that no high ranking officers in Washington attached the significance to this intelligence which hindsight now makes apparent that it must have possessed.

One of the unfortunate circumstances in connection with Magic was the fact that several significant messages were not translated prior to the attack. One of these contained for the first time an inquiry from Tokyo regarding certain defenses of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The limitations of personnel and facilities both in Washington and the field, including the problem of transmission to Washington, was noted in the course of the testimony.

The Committee held that -

> "the officers in the intelligence divisions of the War and Navy Departments had a particular responsibility with respect to the Magic intelligence.....It was the duty of these officers to evaluate and disseminate the Magic in the form of estimates...This responsibility they failed to discharge with that high degree of skill and imagination which this intelligence warranted."

The testimony of Secretary Stimson bore out this view.

Information was available through Magic regarding Japanese instructions to its consulates to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential documents. (See section of this report on Dissemination.) The overwhelming weight of the testimony by Army and Navy experts is to the effect that the destruction of codes and confidential documents under the circumstances prevailing in December 1941 meant war. The Committee took the position that Washington adequately discharged its responsibility in transmitting this information to Hawaii. The Committee points out that -

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"with the failure, however, of Admiral Kimmel to read into this intelligence what it is agreed should have been self-evident to him, it is believed that in the future the intelligence as well as the departmental appraisal and estimate thereof should be supplied field commanders."

On 6 December, the FBI delivered to Army and Navy intelligence officers at Hawaii a transcript of an intercepted radio telephone conversation between a person named Mori in Honolulu and an individual in Japan. The transcript indicated that the latter was interested in daily flights of airplanes, particularly large planes from Honolulu, where the searchlights were being used, and the number of ships present at Pearl Harbor. Reference was made in the conversation to numerous flowers, which was presumed to be a code. The Navy determined that this information should be studied further by Japanese linguists. Admiral Kimmel was not informed and did not see the transcript until after the attack. The evening of 6 December it was brought to the attention of General Short and his G-2 by an assistant G-2, who indicated that a special agent of the FBI was alarmed by what he considered the military implications of the conversation in respect to Pearl Harbor, Both General Short and his G-2 indicated that the assistant was perhaps "too intelligence conscious" and that the message was nothing about which to become excited. The Committee felt that the Mori call pointed directly at Hawaii.

The fortnightly intelligence summary dated December 1, 1941, received by Kimmel from ONI, stated that it believed the major Japanese capital ship strength was in home waters, together with the greatest portion of the Japanese carriers. On December 1, Kimmel's daily summary indicated that the Japanese service radio call signs had changed at midnight, one month after the previous change, whereas the former Japanese practice had

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been to change their call signs every six months. On 2 December, a memorandum from the Fleet Intelligence Officer on the disposition of the Japanese naval force, together with a conversation between Kimmel and this Officer, stressed the point that there was no reliable information on Japanese carrier divisions 1 and 2, consisting of four carriers. No information on carriers was available on 4 December. Admiral Kimmel received this intelligence, but accepted the estimate that they were probably in home waters. The Committee found that,

> "recognising all of the vagaries of radio intelligence analysis, however, it was still not in keeping with his responsibility as Commander in Chief of the Fleet for Admiral Kimmel to ignore the sinister implications of the information supplied through the Radio Intelligence Unit after he had been warned of war. In many respects the picture presented by radio intelligence was among the most significant information relating to <u>when</u> and, to a degree, <u>where</u> the Japanese would possibly attack."

In addition to this material, operational intelligence was available on the day of the attack itself. This included the reports of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, and radar detection of the Japanese raiding force over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of December 7th.

> "Despite the foregoing, the estimate was made and persisted in that Hawaii was safe from an air attack, although the very assumptions made by the Army and Navy Commanders are implicit with the contemplation of an attack from without. General Short assumed the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance. Admiral Kimmel assumed, on the other hand, that the Army would alert its aircraft warning service, antiaircraft guns, and fighter planes."

From the above, it is apparent that there was at least some cognizance in Washington and Hawaii of the possibility of a raid on Pearl Harbor. Much of the material available pointed to hostile action on the

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part of the Japanese, but in the mass of information available, many of the witnesses contended, a very small percentage pointed to Pearl Harbor as the point of attack. Granted that this point was so, and that these items of information which might have produced an estimate of attack on Pearl Harbor loom much larger by hindsight than they did at the time, the Committee felt that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were supplied enough information to make a correct estimate of the situation. That they failed to do. That there may have been other information which could have been supplied them, failed to modify the Committee's conclusion in this respect.

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DISSEMINATION

During the period preceding Pearl Harbor, there appears to have been a failure of proper dissemination of intelligence. This failure in dissemination lay not only between the Washington headquarters of the Army and Navy and their field commands, but also between the services themselves in Hawaii.

Admiral Kimmel's concern in connection with internal Naval distribution of secret material was set forth in a letter to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, in February 1941, in which he stated:

> "I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility /as between ONI and Operations/, it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"

In response, Admiral Stark advised that ONI was fully aware of its responsibilities to keep the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet adequately informed on matters concerning foreign nations and their activities. In addition, in April 1941, instructions were given various naval observers to include the Commander-in- Chief of the Pacific Fleet as an information addressee for all pertinent dispatches, and to furnish one copy of all intelligence reports directly to him.

The Army did not forward the substance of any intercepted Japanese dispatches to field commanders because of its feeling that the Army codes were generally not as secure as those of the Navy. As evidence of this, General Miles, War Department G-2 at the time of Pearl Harbor, testified that he was under the impression that the Navy would promptly disseminate such intelligence to General Short's headquarters.

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A notable failure existed in the dissemination of intelligence between the Army and Navy commands in Hawaii. For example, the Army radar unit, which first picked up the incoming Japanese planes, plotted them back out to the north following the attack. Yet this information, which would have made an effective search for the task force possible, was not employed by either service. Admiral Kimmel stated he did not receive the information for two days.

A chart showing the position of the Japanese carriers was taken from a Japanese plane by the Army on 7 December. It was not shown to the Navy until the afternoon.

Admiral Kimmel stated that he did not supply General Short with information he had received from Washington concerning Japanese orders to destroy codes, ciphers and confidential documents, adding that, "I did not consider that of any vital importance when I received it...." General Short, on the other hand, complaining that he was not provided with this intelligence by the Navy, indicated that it was "the one thing that would have affected me more than any other matter....", and that if any of these dispatches concerning the destruction of the codes had been furnished him by the Navy, he would have gone into a more serious alert. The opinion of virtually all witnesses holds that the code burning intelligence was the most significant information received between 27 November and 6 December regarding the imminence of war.

The evidence before the Committee shows that although Kimmel received significant information on four different occasions between 3 and 6 December concerning the destruction of codes and confidential documents in Japanese diplomatic establishments, and that although he knew that the

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Navy Department had also ordered the destruction of its codes in our outlying possessions, he failed to convey this information to General Short. It is the Committee's conclusion that Kimmel's failure to supply Short with this intelligence was "inexcusable."

Despite Kimmel's personal failure (to inform Short), the testimony reveals that on about 3 December General Short's assistant G-2 learned from Navy sources that Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere, were destroying their codes and papers. Further testimony shows that the assistant G-2 received similar information regarding Honolulu from the FBI. There is also evidence that this was communicated to General Short, although the Minority Report considers it an open question and the evidence not decisive.

In making the finding set forth above, the Committee points out that the information on code destruction which Short received was not supplied him directly by the War Department.

Both Kimmel and Short have testified that they were wrongfully deprived of intelligence available to Washington through Magic, which would have completely altered their estimate of the situation and would have resulted in a proper alert and appropriate dispositions had they received it. In particular, there were four messages, or groups of messages, received through Magic which might have been particularly significant in Hawaii. The Committee is of the opinion that this intelligence should have been supplied Kimmel and Short (together with other available information and intelligence) to assist them in making their estimate of the situation.

However, the Committee further finds that, between them, both Commanders had considerable vital intelligence indicating a possible attack on Hawaii. They had, inter alia:

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1. Correspondence with Washington and plans revealing the possible dangers of air attack;

2. The warning dispatches from Washington;

3. The code destruction intelligence;

4. Radio intelligence concerning the "lost" Japanese carriers;

5. The "Mori" call. (See "Research and Evaluation" section);

6. The report of sighting and subsequent attack on a Japanese submarine in close proximity to Pearl Harbor (early on 7 December);

7. Radar detection of the Japanese planes over 130 miles from Oahu on the morning of 7 December.

Noting the erroneous assumptions which General Short and Admiral Kimmel made regarding each other's activities in Hawaii, and the estimates and actions which they took based on the intelligence available to them there, the Committee believes it problematical as to what steps Kimmel and Short would have taken had they received all of the intelligence which they contend was withheld from them. As a result of this, the Committee finds that "the ultimate and direct responsibility for failure to engage the Japanese on the morning of 7 December with the weapons at their disposal rests essentially and properly with the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii..."

However, it is the Committee's additional conclusion that the officers in the Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments "had a <u>particular</u> responsibility with respect to the <u>Magic</u> intelligence;" that it was their duty to evaluate and disseminate <u>Magic</u> in the form of estimates. This responsibility, the Committee feels, these officers "failed to discharge with that high degree of skill and imagination which this intelligence warranted." The Committee further stated:

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"That the completely ineffective liaison between the Army and the Navy in Hawaii at a time when the fullest exchange of intelligence was absolutely imperative, dictates that military and naval intelligence, particularly, must be consolidated."

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In its final Section, the Committee devotes its attention to "Supervisory, Administrative, and Organizational Deficiencies in our Military and Naval Establishments Revealed by The Pearl Harbor Investigation." In this Section, the question is posed: "Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7 - Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur?" The reactions of the Committee to this latter question are of sufficient interest to warrant their being quoted herewith verbatim insofar as they refer to intelligence:

> "1. Operational and Intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility.
>
> "Reviewing the testimony of the Director of War Plans and the Director of Naval Intelligence, the conclusion is inescapable that the proper demarcation of responsibility between these two divisions of the Navy Department did not exist. War Plans appears to have insisted that since it had the duty of issuing operational orders it must arrogate the prerogative of evaluating intelligence; Naval Intelligence, on the other hand, seems to have regarded the matter of evaluation as properly its function. It is clear that this intradepartmental misunderstanding and near conflict was not resolved before December 7 and beyond question it prejudiced the effectiveness of Naval Intelligence.
>
> "In Hawaii, there was such a marked failure to allocate responsibility in the case of the Fourteenth Naval District that Admiral Bloch testified he did not know whom the commander in chief would hold responsible in the event of shortcomings with respect to the condition and readiness of aircraft. The position of Admiral Bellinger was a wholly anomalous one. He appears to have been responsible to everyone and to no one. The pyramiding of superstructures of organization cannot be conducive to efficiency and endangers the very function of our military and naval services." (p. 254)

> "2. Supervisory officials cannot safely take anything for granted in the alerting of subordinates.
>
> ".....Navy Department officials have almost unanimously testified that instructions to burn codes mean 'war in any man's language' and that in supplying Admiral Kimmel this information

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they were entitled to believe he would attach the proper significance to this intelligence. Yet the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet testified that he did not interpret these dispatches to mean that Japan contemplated immediate war on the United States.....The simple fact is that the dispatches were not properly interpreted. Had the Navy Department not taken for granted that Kimmel would be alerted by them but instead have given him the benefit of its interpretation, there could now be no argument as to what the state of alertness should have been based on such dispatches. With Pearl Harbor as a sad experience, crucial intelligence should in the future be supplied commanders accompanied by the best estimate of its significance." (p. 254-255)

"3. Any doubt as to whether outposts should be given information should always be resolved in favor of supplying the information.

"Admiral Stark hesitated about sending the 'one o'clock' intelligence to the Pacific outposts for the reason that he regarded them as adequately alerted and he did not want to confuse them. As has been seen, he was properly entitled to believe that naval establishments were adequately alert, but the fact is that one - Hawaii - was not in a state of readiness. This one exception is proof of the principle that any question as to whether information should be supplied the field should always be resolved in favor of transmitting it." (p. 255)

.....

"8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials.

"On occasion witnesses have echoed the sentiment that the Pearl Harbor debacle was made possible, not by the egregious errors or poor judgment of any individual or individuals but rather by reason of the imperfection and deficiencies of the system whereby Army and Navy intelligence was coordinated and evaluated. Only partial credence, however, can be extended this conclusion inasmuch as no amount of coordination and no system could be effected to compensate for lack of alertness and imagination. Nevertheless, there is substantial basis, from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence. And the assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions.

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"The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to have been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Departments. It seems to have been regarded as just another tour of duty, as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to relegate intelligence to a role of secondary importance.

"As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments, (1) for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the background, capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining them in the work over an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data received; and (3) for the centralization of responsibility for handling intelligence to avoid all of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent." (p. 257-258)

.....

"10. <u>There is no substitute for imagination and resourcefulness on the part of supervisory and intelligence officials.</u>

"As reflected by an examination of the situation in Hawaii, there was a failure to employ the necessary imagination with respect to the intelligence which was at hand.

"Washington, like Hawaii, possessed unusually significant and vital intelligence. Had greater imagination and a keener awareness of the significance of intelligence existed, concentrating and applying it to particular situations, it is proper to suggest that someone should have concluded that Pearl Harbor was a likely point of Japanese attack.

"The committee feels that the failure to demonstrate the highest imagination with respect to the intelligence which was available in Hawaii and in Washington is traceable, at least in part, to the failure to accord to intelligence work the important and significant role which it deserves." (p. 259)

.....

"11. <u>Restriction of highly confidential information to a minimum number of officials, while often necessary, should not be carried to the point of prejudicing the work of the organisation.</u>

"The Magic intelligence was preeminently important and the necessity for keeping it confidential cannot be overemphasized. However, so closely held and top secret was this intelligence that it appears the <u>fact</u> the Japanese codes had been broken was regarded as of more <u>importance</u> than the <u>information</u> obtained from decod-

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ed traffic. The result of this rather specious premise was to leave large numbers of policy-making and enforcement officials in Washington completely oblivious of the most pertinent information concerning Japan.

"The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, was charged with combating espionage, sabotage, and un-American activities within the United States. On February 15, 1941, Tokyo dispatched to Washington a detailed outline as to the type of espionage information desired from this country. The FBI was never informed of this vital information necessary to the success of its work, despite the fact that the closest liaison was supposed to exist among thw FBI, Naval Intelligence, and Military Intelligence.

"General Hayes A. Kroner, who was in charge of the intelligence branch of G-2, has testified that he at no time was permitted to avail himself of the Magic. And this despite the fact that to effectively perform his work he should have known of this intelligence and one of his subordinates, Colonel Bratton, was 'loaned' to General Miles to distribute magic materials to authorized recipients.

"While, as previously indicated, it is appreciated that promiscuous distribution of highly confidential material is dangerous, it nevertheless should be made available to all those whose responsibility cannot adequately and intelligently be discharged without knowledge of such confidential data. It would seem that through sufficient paraphrase of the original material the source of the information could have been adequately protected. Certainly as great confidence could be placed in ranking officials of various departments and bureaus of the Government as in the numerous technicians, cryptographers, translators, and clerks required for the interception and processing of the Magic." (p. 261-262)

.....

"17. An official who neglects to familiarise himself in detail with his organisation should forfeit his responsibility.

".....Admirals Stark and Turner both have testified they 'thought' the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet was receiving the Magic intelligence. Yet in a period of over 6 months, with relations between the United States and Japan mounting in tenseness and approaching a crisis, neither of these ranking officers determined for a fact whether the fleet was receiving this information....." (p. 263)

.....

"20. Personal or official jealousy will wreck any organization.

"This principle is the result of the general impression obtained by the Committee concerning the relationship between the

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Army and the Navy as well as concerning certain intraorganizational situations which existed. The relationship, understanding, and coordination between the War Plans Division and the Office of Naval Intelligence were wholly unsatisfactory. The War Plans Division, particularly, appears to have had an overzealous disposition to preserve and enhance its prerogatives....." (p. 264)

"23. Superiors must at all times keep their subordinates adequately informed and, conversely, subordinates should keep their superiors informed.

"In Washington, Admiral Wilkinson, Director of Naval Intelligence, and Captain McCollum, Chief of the Far Eastern Section of that Division, were not adequately and currently informed as to the nature of the dispatches being sent to our outposts emanating from the War Plans Division. Subordinate officials in both War and Navy Departments failed to appreciate the importance and necessity of getting to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark the first 13 parts of the Japanese 14-part memorandum immediately on the evening of December 6. Colonel French did not inform the Chief of Staff that he had been unable to raise the Army radio in Hawaii on the morning of December 7.

"In Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel failed to insure that Admiral Bellinger, who was responsible for Navy patrol planes, knew of the war warning of November 27. Admiral Newton, as previously pointed out, was permitted to leave Pearl Harbor with a task force completely oblivious of any of the warning messages. General Short, construing the caution to disseminate the information in the warning of November 27 to 'minimum essential officers' in a too-narrow manner, failed to inform the essential and necessary officers of his command of the acute situation in order that the proper alertness might pervade the Hawaiian Department." (p. 265)

"24. The administrative organization of any establishment must be designed to locate failures and to assess responsibility.

"The committee has been very much concerned about the fact that there was no way in which it could be determined definitely that any individual saw a particular message among the Magic materials. It does not appear that any record system was established for initialing the messages or otherwise fixing responsibility. The system existing left subordinate officers charged with the duty of disseminating the Magic at the complete mercy of superior officers with respect to any question as to whether a particular message had been delivered to or seen by them. (p. 265-266)

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The specific conclusions and recommendations of the Pearl Harbor Congressional Committee with respect to Intelligence are of such interest that they are quoted verbatim from the report herewith.

The following are Conclusions with respect to responsibilities so far as they effect intelligence.

"8. Specifically, the Hawaiian commands failed —

.....

"(b) To integrate and coordinate their facilities for defense and to alert properly the Army and Navy establishments in Hawaii, particularly in the light of the warnings and intelligence available to them during the period November 27 to December 7, 1941." (Page 252)

"(c) To effect liaison on a basis designed to acquaint each of them with the operations of the other, which was necessary to their joint security, and to exchange fully all significant intelligence." (Page 252)

.....

"(g) To appreciate the significance of intelligence and other information available to them." (Page 252)....

"11. The Intelligence and War Plans Divisions of the War and Navy Departments failed:

"(a) To give careful and thoughtful consideration to the intercepted messages from Tokyo to Honolulu of September 24, November 15, and November 20 (the Harbor berthing plan and related dispatches) and to raise a question as to their significance. Since they indicated a particular interest in the Pacific Fleet's base, this intelligence should have been appreciated and supplied the Hawaiian commanders for their assistance, along with other information available to them, in making their estimate of the situation."

"(b) To be properly on the qui vive to receive the 'one o'clock' intercept and to recognize in the message the fact that some Japanese military action would very possibly occur somewhere at 1 p.m., December 7. If properly appreciated, this intelli-

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"gence should have suggested a dispatch to all Pacific outpost commanders supplying this information, as General Marshall attempted to do immediately upon seeing it." (Page 252)

The following specific Recommendations are made in the Committee report with respect to intelligence:

"That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received. The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves." (Page 253)

"That effective steps be taken to insure that statutory or other restrictions do not operate to the benefit of an enemy or other forces inimical to the Nation's security and to the handicap of our own intelligence agencies. With this in mind, the Congress should give serious study to, among other things, the Communications Act of 1934; to suspension in proper instances of the statute of limitations during war (it was impossible during the war to prosecute violations relating to the "Magic" without giving the secret to the enemy); to legislation designed to prevent unauthorized sketching photographing, and mapping of military and naval reservations in peacetime; and to legislation fully protecting the security of classified matter." (Page 253)

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